OICLAIIIrltD AND 1ELEASED BY DtNTRO, INULLIBENCE ABENCY DUDOOOtlit1041EXEMPT 104382D OiNUOI MAME ACT .49Ce AO Mt The project is considered to be a ...

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The project is considered to be a failure due to thefact that it has been not allowed to be developed and materialized at all, according to the original plan agreed upon in 1. Actuahly, it was substituted by a completely digferent one impesed by Frankfort Station which in practice nullified the original plan. Contrary to the original project by which 0 wad supposed to cover the whole of Wostren Europe, be was restricted in his operations to West Germany alone. Oddly enough, the revised Frankfiert plan which amounted to an abondoment of the actual project and its =rejection was presueebly considered to be a testing ground for purposefulness and success of fiSject itself (and Ows capability to implement it). Parallel with geographic and "operational" restriction ( elimination of other than touristic operations) went a time curtailment lirdting the testing period to one year only. On the whole it seamed to be a purely mechanical approach based on the principle of "quota fulfilling". The latter envisaged 2-3 "good tourieyic operations". From the very beginning C pointed out and continued to stress all the time that Germany alone with her cooperatively poor potential was not sufficient for development of the project. Restricting of his activities to Germany which had to be provebto be productive "by all means" was identical with operating agAnst apy "law of marginal revenue" and meant missing and qsting of good Opportunities outside of Gernaw. Frankfort"s parochial approach plus lack of an agried policy and co-ordination on the subject between- the latter (Frknkfort) and W. was bound to Create some frustrating sitaations Which left with C. :a strong impression of a big hotsatinchic mesa existing inside the Firm. Frankfort ft s plan of March 1961 to extend 0"8 activities into German potential wast of course, to be eventually very conducive to "quota fulfilment" but on the other hand it was again contrary to original project ( concentration on Ukrainian potential). Frankfort Station seemed to be somewhat "obsessed" with suspicion that . C. might use his assighment primarhly for his party- .political operations complete control of his and bence,presumably, generated the strhng tende jacket on the one hand activities amounting sometimes to some sort of a and insisitence on introducing his agents to the case officer.on the other. In some situations ,however, the latter approach would not serve ite purpose and could1Wrpadize operations. In general ,of some influence was also the fact of some new apprehensions on thi the part of emigrees created by a new course of Soviet internal politics which was interpreted by them as 6 reversal of so called liberal trend of 1956-58. Many potential visitors among emigrees took consequently a more cautious attitude of wait and see becatse of eventual rike. The original project has had and still has good chances to be successful

provided it will be realized as a whole in geographical and operational sense. The potential itself varies from country to country and with a net of good spotters all over Europe it should always produee 3-3 simixoperations a year. A minimum period of 2 years is necessary for proper development of the project whereby the first year ,beside use of opportunities ,shauld be maibly devoted to building up of spotters netomnd exploration and preparation of accesses to targets inside.

Nazi, War crimes, Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, OSS, World War Two, WWII, WW2